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RECENT DECISIONS
It is extremely difficult to reconcile these decisions with the rea-
soning of the general rule, for there seems to be no adequate reason
why the parties are not to be charged with providing for such contin-
gencies when they contracted, as they were so charged in the pria-
cipal case. 7 It is equally probable that they would and should foresee
that there would be waste or loss in rent and profits in the event of
non-occupancy as they would and should foresee the many other fact
situations upon which the other actions were brought. On the other
hand, if the rule is too stringent and there are valid reasons for re-
laxing it as to waste and percentage rents then there are comparable
reasons for relaxing it in diverse situations such as that presented in
the principal case.
M. F. B., JR.
PROPERTY-INJUNCTION-RIGHT OF WAY-ADVERSE PossES-
SION-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-Plaintiff and defendants own adjoining
parcels of land. These two pieces of property were owned by one
individual in 1891. Subsequently, he subdivided the parcel and sold
the one now held by the plaintiff, retaining for himself the piece now
owned by defendants. This original owner continued to live on the
property, now defendants', for thirty years, during which time he
never claimed any right to use the path or driveway in the rear of
plaintiff's house. When he wished to use the path he asked the per-
mission of plaintiff's predecessor in title, and an oral arrangement
was made whereby he had the permission to use it as long as he did
not interfere with the owner's use. This arrangement existed until
the original ownei' conveyed the property to another predecessor of
defendants' title, in 1923, who continued to use the plaintiff's path
or driveway for the same purposes, without any claim of right or
interest in the driveway. None of the deeds in defendants' chain
of title contain any grant of, or reference to, this right of way now
claimed by defendants.
Plaintiff erected a barricade across the land in dispute and the
defendants tore the barricade down three times. Plaintiff now brings
action against defendants for an injunction restraining defendants
from using lands in the immediate rear of plaintiff's house as a right
of way and for damages. Held, judgment for plaintiff, granting an
injunction and recovery of damages for repair of barricade. Cobb
v. Avery, - Misc. -, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
The defendants based their defense upon two premises. They
claimed that they had acquired a right of way across the premises of
7 Yet the court arbitrarily said in the principal case that the result would
be different if it had fallen into either of the exceptions. Congressional Amuse-
ment Corporation v. Weltman, 55 A. 2d 95, 96 (1947).
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the plaintiff immediately in the rear of the plaintiff's house by grant
and also by adverse possession. In turn, their claim to a right of
way by adverse possession rested upon two assumptions: namely, a
public acquisition of a right of way over the premises in question
by prescription, and secondly, a private right of way in the defen-
dants by prescription.
A right of way may be acquired by prescription where a user
thereof for the prescriptive period is accompanied by the elements
necessary to give an easement by prescription.' An easement by pre-
scription is based upon the presumption that the right has been
granted, but that the grant has been lost; and generally it may be
acquired by the exclusive and uninterrupted use and enjoyment of
the right for a period of time analogous to the time sufficient to ac-
quire title to the soil by adverse possession. 2 In New York this
period was reduced, in 1932, to fifteen years.3
The use and enjoyment which will give title by prescription to
an easement or other incorporeal right is substantially the same in
quality and characteristics as the adverse possession which will give
title to real estate.4  That is, it must be adverse, under a claim of
right, continuous and uninterrupted, open and notorious, exclusive,
with the knowledge and acquiescence of the 6wner of the servient
tenement, and must continue for the full prescriptive period and
while the owner of the servient tenement is under no legal disability
to assert his rights or to make a grant. 5
A prescriptive right is not looked upon with favor by the law,
and it is essential that all of the elements of use and enjoyment,
stated above, concur in order to create an easement by prescription.8
It is generally stated that in order for a user to ripen into a
prescriptive right it must not only be under a claim of right, but
must also be with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of
the servient tenement,7 as such acquiescence is the foundation of the
right by prescription, and anything which disproves acquiescence
rebuts the presumption of a grant 8
It is not necessary, in the absence of a statute, for the party
claiming an easement to make an express declaration of his claim,
but it is not sufficient that the claim of right exists only in the mind
1 Olofson v. Malpede, 127 Misc. 813, 216 N. Y. Supp. 695 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
2 Powlowski v. Mohawk Golf Club, 204 App. Div. 200, 198 N. Y. Supp.
30 (3d Dep't 1923), revemsing 119 Misc. 139, 195 N. Y. Supp. 788 (Sup. Ct.
1922); Moore v. Day, 199 App. Div. 76, 191 N. Y. Supp. 731 (3d Dep't 1921),
aff'd, 235 N. Y. 554, 139 N. E. 732 (1921).
3 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 34-37.
4 Zbyszinsky v. Lopopolo, 112 Pa. Super. 68, 170 Atl. 362 (1934).
5 See NotIe, 28 C. J. S., EASEMENTS § 10 (1941).6 Moore v. Day, 199 App. Div. 76, 191 N. Y. Supp. 731 (3d Dep't 1921),
aff'd, 235 N. Y. 554, 139 N. E. 732 (1921).
7 Abrams v. State, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 306 (Ct. Cl. 1939).
8 Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 98 Atl. 743 (1916).
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of the person claiming it. It must in some way be communicated
or asserted in such a manner that the owner may know of it. This
knowledge may be actual or it may be implied from a use which is
so visible, open and notorious that such notice or knowledge will
be presumed.9 If such use is made of the easement as to constitute
a claim of right, then the owner of the land is put on inquiry as to
the character of the use. The owner in such case, is charged with
notice irrespective of whether he had actual notice or not.10
Ordinarily, if a claimant uses the premises and the acts con-
stituting the user are of such nature and frequency as to give notice
to the landowner of the right being claimed against him, the user
will be considered continuous. Nevertheless, there must be repeated
acts of such character and at such intervals as will afford a sufficient
indication to the owner that an easement is claimed.1 Mere occa-
sional acts of trespass do not satisfy the rule that the user must be
continuous, even though they are repeated over a long period of
time.1
2
In order to be adverse, the user must be exercised under a claim
of right, and not as a mere privilege or license revocable at the pleas-
ure of the owner of the land, and such claim must be known to the
owner.'3 A permissive use of the land of another, that is, a use or
license exercised in subordination to the other's claim and ownership,
is not adverse, and cannot give an easement by prescription no mat-
ter how long it may be continued, 14 since a mere lapse of time under
such circumstances raises no presumption of a grant. The owner
may prohibit the use or discontinue it altogether at his pleasure, so
long as it is merely permissive.- Furthermore, the rule that precludes
a permissive use from ripening into a right to continued enjoyment
applies whether the permission, consent, or license is expressly given,
or whether it is implied; 15 and it applies to use by a grantee of the
original licensee, even though such grantee has no notice of the
license. 16
The fact that a user is permissive in its inception does not in
itself prevent it from subsequently becoming adverse and ripening
9 Sewall v. FitzGibbon, 233 App. Div. 70, 251 N. Y. Supp. 599 (3d Dep't
1931).
10 Redemeyer v. Carroll, 21 Cal. App. 2d 217, 68 P. 2d 739 (1937).
11 Dartnell v. Bidwell, supra note 8.
12 Downie v. City of Renton, 167 Wash. 374, 9 P. 2d 372, reversing 162
Wash. 181, 298 Pac. 454 (1931).
13 Van Overbeek v. Batsleer, 191 N. Y. Supp. 49 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
14Pirman v. Confer, 273 N. Y. 357. 7 N. E. 2d 262, 111 A. L. R. 216,
modifying 247 App. Div. 839, 286 N. Y. Supp. 457 (3d Dep't 1936), reargument
denied, 274 N. Y. 570, 10 N. E. 2d 556 (1937), motiomr granted, 275 N. Y.
624, 11 N. E. 2d 788 (1937) ; In re Scott, 200 App. Div. 599, 193 N. Y. Supp.
403 (1st Dep't 1922).
15 Moore v. Day, 199 App. Div. 76, 191 N. Y. Supp. 731 (3d Dep't 1921),
aff'd, 235 N. Y. 554, 139 N. E. 732 (1921).
16 Luce v. Carley, 24 Wend. 451, 35 Am. Dec. 637 (1840).
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into an easement by prescription.17 If a licensee renounces the au-
thority under which he began the use and claims it as his own right,
and that fact is brought to the knowledge of the licensor, after which
the licensee continues the use under such adverse claim exclusively,
continuously and uninterruptedly for the full prescriptive period, the
right will become absolute.18 Nevertheless, if a use begins as a per-
missive use it is presumed to continue as such, and in order to trans-
form it into an adverse one there must be a distinct and positive
assertion of a right hostile to the rights of the owner, and such asser-
tion must be brought to the attention of the owner,' 9 and the use
continue for the full prescriptive period under the assertion of right,
excluding the time under which the user was permissive. The rule
is not affected by the fact that the privilege is claimed by successors
in interest of the party to whom the permissive use was originally
given .20
In the principal case, it was established by a fair preponderance
of evidence that the defendants' predecessors in title had for over
fifteen years traveled across the plaintiff's strip of land for the pur-
pose of drawing coal, wood and furniture to the defendants' house.
This use of the alleged right of way was with the consent of the
plaintiff's predecessors in title and defendants did not establish a right
of way by prescription, no matter how long it was used, because the
permissive character of the use was not repudiated. 21
Where a landowner opens up a way on his own land for his
own use and convenience, the mere use thereof by another, under
circumstances which do not injure the road nor interfere with the
owner's use of it, will not in the absence of circumstances indicating
a claim of right be considered as adverse, and will not ripen into a
prescriptive right no matter how long continued.22
Insofar as public acquisition by prescription is concerned, there
was not such a continuous use by the public of these lands in the
immediate rear of plaintiff's premises to warrant a finding that the
public in general acquired a right of way over it. While several
persons walked across this strip of land for the purpose of going to
and from the trade center of the village, it was so used by the defen-
dants' predecessors in title with the express permission and consent
of the plaintiff's predecessors in title. It was not used by the public
in general and the use by the various persons was not of such a
nature as to establish a right of way by prescription. An unorganized
17 Sallan Jewelry Co. v. Bird, 240 Mich. 346, 215 N. W. 349 (1927).
18 Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d 1070 (1935).
19 Moore v. Day, supra note 15.
20 Redemeyer v. Carroll, supra note 10.
21 Moore v. Day, supra note 15.
22 Sewall v. FitzGibbons, 233 App. Div. 70, 73, 251 N. Y. Supp. 599 (3d




public cannot acquire a right of way by prescription,3 and defen-
dants did not acquire a right of way by prescription because they
used it in common with the public.
2 4
Defendants in the principal case also sought to establish a grant
of a right of way across the plaintiff's premises but failed to prove
a valid written conveyance of the alleged easement so as to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds.&2 5 The clause "together with the appurte-
nances and all the estate and rights of the parties of the first part
in and to said premises" in the defendants' deed and the deeds of
their predecessors in title, was not a grant of the right of way. Ex-
cept for necessities, "appurtenances" include only such things as are
contained within the boundaries of the land demised.2 6 Nor can a
permanent interest in land, even by way of easement, be created by
or under a parol license.27
The burden of proving all the facts necessary to constitute ad-
verse possession is upon the one who asserts it,28 and the defendants
failed to do so on either of the grounds claimed.
As to the propriety of the remedy sought by plaintiff, it has been
held in Sadlier v. City of New York,29 that in a suit to restrain a
continuous trespass, which the facts in the principal case have been
held to constitute, the court should grant all the relief that the nature
of the action and facts demand.
This decision follows the established pattern of law both in New
York and elsewhere in reference to right of ways by prescription or
grant.
M.M.
SERVICE OF CIVIL PRocESs ON SuNDAY.-Petitioners, who were
personally served with process on Sunday in a civil action, appeared
specially to quash the summons and the return of service indorsed
upon it, contending the court lacked personal jurisdiction, as the ser-
vice on Sunday was void. Motion to quash was denied and peti-
tioners seek a writ to prohibit the civil action. A statute provides,
with a few enumerated uncommon exceptions into which petitioners
do not fall, that service of civil process on Sunday is void. Held,
writ of prohibition granted. State ex rel. Staley, et al. v. Hereford,
Judge, et al., - W. Va. -, 45 S. E. 2d 738 (1947).
23 See Note, 28 C. J. S., EASEMENTS § 8 (1941).
24 JONES, TAnrxsE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENT § 274 (1st ed. 1898).
25 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 242.
26 Van Roo v. Van Roo, 268 App. Div. 170, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 220 (4th Dep't
1944).
27 Selden v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 29 N. Y. 634 (1864).
28 Sewall v. FitzGibbon, supra note 22.
29 104 App. Div. 82, 93 N. Y. Supp. 579 (2d Dep't 1905), aff'd, 185 N. Y.
408, 78 N. E. 272 (1906).
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